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The Treatment Of Foreign Income
Taxes Under the California Bank and
Corporation Tax Law
ERIC J. COFFILL*
Numerous articles have addressed the manner and circumstances
under which foreign income taxes paid may be either credited against
United States income tax or deducted against the gross income of
a taxpayer for federal tax purposes.' However, little attention has
been given to the states' treatment of foreign income taxes paid by
a taxpayer subject to state taxation.
This article will examine how California treats foreign income taxes
paid by taxpayers who are subject to the California Bank and Cor-
poration Tax Law.2 California, unlike the federal tax system, does
not allow either a credit or a deduction for the payment of foreign
taxes on or according to or measured by income. However, payments
made to the government of a foreign country which are in the nature
of something other than an "income" tax, such as royalties or other
* Tax Counsel, California Franchise Tax Board, Sacramento, California. J.D. McGeorge
School of Law, University of the Pacific, 1978. A.B. Occidental College, 1974. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and should not be attributed to either the Franchise
Tax Board or the State of California.
1. For example, recent articles in the area include Levey, Creditability of a Foreign Tax:
The Principles, the Regulations and the Complexity, 3 J. L. & Com. 193 (1983); Isenbergh,
The Foreign Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies, and Creditable Taxes, 39 TAx L. REv. 227 (1984);
Lieberman, Whether and to What Extent a Foreign Tax is Creditable under Final Regulations,
J. TAx'N, February 1984, p. 98.
2. The Bank and Corporation Tax Law is found in the California Revenue and Taxation
Code, Division 2, Part 11, §§23001-26491.
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types of taxes, may be allowed as a deduction. Thus, the classifica-
tion of a levy by a foreign government as an income tax has a signifi-
cant impact upon a California taxpayer because any payments made
under that levy are not deductible for California state tax purposes.
Central to the issue of whether a payment of taxes to a foreign
country will be allowed as a deduction is whether that payment is
of a tax on or according to or measured by "income" as that term
is used in California Revenue and Taxation Code3 section 24345. This
article will identify the significant elements of an "income" tax as
those elements have evolved under section 24345 and the California
statutory scheme. A discussion also follows of why that statutory
scheme is consistent with the method used in California of taxing
on a source basis as opposed to a residence basis, and why it is
unnecessary for California to allow either a deduction or a credit for
the payment of income taxes to the government of a foreign country.
This article will also identify those areas which have been, and should
continue to be, the more frequent sources of controversy and litiga-
tion in this area. Finally, the article will discuss the definition of "in-
come" as contained in the final federal foreign tax credit regulations
of 1983, and the impact, if any, of those federal regulations upon
the California scheme which disallows a deduction for foreign income
taxes.
SECTION 24345 AND THE CALIFORNIA STATUTORY FRAmEWORK
The issue of the deductibility of a foreign income tax may arise
in computing the net income of a taxpayer subject under the Bank
and Corporation Tax Law to either the California franchise tax" or
the California corporation income tax.5 The basic statutory provision
3. All references hereinafter to code sections are to the California Revenue and Taxation
Code, except where otherwise noted.
4. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE, §§23101-23364(a). Generally speaking, the franchise tax is
imposed on corporations which are "doing business" in California and are not expressly exempted
under the Bank and Corporation Tax Law or the Constitution of California. Id. §23151(a).
"Doing business" means "actively engaging in any transaction for the purpose of financial
or pecuniary gain or profit." Id. §23101. A minimum franchise tax is imposed on such
corporations regardless of the corporation's activity or its profitability, and on corporations
qualified to do business in California.
5. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE, §§23501-23572. Generally speaking, the corporation income
tax is imposed on all general corporations which, while not "doing business" in California,
have income "derived from sources within this state . . .. " A corporation may be subject
to the minimum franchise tax (because of qualification) and the income tax (because of de-
riving income from California sources though not "doing business"). In this case, the minimum
franchise tax is allowed as an offset against the income tax. Id. §23503.
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which governs the deductibility of foreign taxes paid by a California
corporate taxpayer6 is section 24345, which provides in pertinent part: 7
There shall be allowed as a deduction- (a) Taxes or licenses paid
or accrued during the income year except:
(1) Taxes paid to the State under this part.
(2) Taxes on or according to or measured by income or profits paid
or accrued within the income year imposed by the authority of
(A) The Government of the United States or any foreign country; or
(B) Any state, territory, county, school district, municipality, or other
taxing subdivision of any state or territory.
Thus, section 24345 disallows a deduction for "taxes on or accord-
ing to or measured by income or profits" paid or accrued within
the income year and imposed by authority of a foreign country. This
disallowance of a deduction for foreign income taxes is an exception
to the statutory general rule set forth in section 24345 that taxes paid
are allowed as a deduction. As originally enacted in 1929, the
predecessor to section 24345 disallowed as a deduction only taxes paid
"on income or profits." 8 The current language "on or according to
or measured by income or profits" was added by amendment in 1933. 9
The purpose of this amendment was to make nondeductible all taxes
measured by income no matter what they were levied upon. 0 It should
also be noted that California is not the only state which denies by
statute a deduction from the taxable base for corporate net income
tax purposes for foreign taxes on or measured by income."
6. "Corporate taxpayer" refers herein to a taxpayer subject to either the California fran-
chise tax or the California corporation income tax.
7. Section 24345 was added by 1955 CAL. STAT. c. 938, §20, at 1581, eff. June 6, 1955,
and amended by 1957 CAL. STAT. c. 544, §5 at 1602, eff. May 30, 1957.
8. 1929 CAL. STAT. c. 13, §8 at 21.
9. 1933 CAL. STAT. c. 209, §I(c) at 687.
10. MCA, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 115 Cal. App. 3d 185, 194, 171 Cal. Rptr. 242,
248 (1981).
11. The Multistate Tax Commission recently surveyed all fifty states and the District of
Columbia regarding whether they allowed a deduction from the taxable base for corporate
net income tax purposes for foreign taxes on or measured by net income. The responses in-
dicate that as of December 1983, five states (Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington and
Wyoming) do not impose a tax on net income. Twenty-two jurisdictions (Alaska, California,
District of Columbia, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia and West Virginia) responded that no deduction
was allowed. Ten states (Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana,
Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico and Wisconsin) responded that a deduction was allowed.
Eleven states (Maine, Maryland, Tennessee, Vermont, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota,
Ohio and Rhode Island) reported the allowance of a deduction for foreign taxes only if taken
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As will be seen in the following section, the California Franchise
Tax Board,' 2 the California State Board of Equalization ("the
Board"),' 3 and the California courts have often interpreted section
24345 by looking to interpretations of statutory counterparts under
the California Personal Income Tax Law." The deductibility of foreign
income taxes under the Personal Income Tax Law is now governed
by section 17220, which provides that no deduction shall be allowed
for "foreign income" taxes.'"
Section 17220 was recently added to the Code, and is operative
for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1983.6 Its predecessor
was first enacted in 1943 as former section 17305, which provided
generally for the deduction of all taxes except those specifically
enumerated to be nondeductible. Among those made nondeductible
were "(b) Taxes on or according to or measured by income or pro-
fits ... imposed by the authority of (1) the Government of the United
States or any foreign country. . . . "" This crucial language was
retained through several revisions and amendments, including when
the section was renumbered to section 17204 in 1955.18
as a deduction, not a credit, on the federal return. Arizona responded that a deduction was
allowed in the amount of foreign tax used to offset federal income tax liability, unless the
credits are attributable to dividends received from controlled corporations which are subtracted
under other provisions of state law. Colorado does not allow a deduction for foreign taxes paid
to foreign countries, but does not have a provision requiring the adding back to federal net in-
come of deductions taken for taxes paid to political subdivisions of foreign countries. Oregon
allows a deduction for foreign taxes upon dividends, interest, or royalties if they are included
in the tax base. Survey of States Regarding Deduction for Payment of State, Local, Federal
& Foreign Taxes, 1 MULTISTATE TAX ConaussioN REvtaw 22, March 1984.
12. The California Franchise Tax Board is charged by statute with the administration and
enforcement of the Personal Income Tax Law and the Bank and Corporation Tax Law. CAL.
REv. & TAx CODE, §§19251, 26422. While the Franchise Tax Board has the power pursuant
to this authority to issue rulings, few recent rulings have been issued in the area of foreign
taxes. Legal Ruling No. 343, dated October 5, 1970, CCH Cal. Tax Reports 204-419 states:
"In the future, Legal Rulings will normally not be issued on the subject of particular foreign
taxes, since any decision regarding the tax law of a foreign country must, of necessity, be
very limited in its application and is therefore of little precedent value."
13. The California State Board of Equalization (hereinafter referred to as "the Board")
hears and determines appeals of taxpayers from deficiency assessments and from the denial
by the Franchise Tax Board of claims for refund. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE, §§18593-596,
19057-61, 25666-67, 26075-77.
14. The Personal Income Tax Law is found in CAL. REv. AND TAx CODE, §§17001-19452.
15. CAL. Rav. & TAX. CODE, §17220 provides in pertinent part: "No deduction shall be
allowed for . . . (a) state, local, and foreign income, war profits, and excess profits taxes
.. ." Reenacted from former §17204 by 1983 CAL. STAT. 488, operative for taxable
years beginning on or after January 1, 1983.
16. 1983 CAL. STAT. c. 488, §29.
17. 1943 CAL. STAT. c. 659, §1.
18. 1955 CAL. STAT. c. 939, §2.
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Between 1955 and the time of its repeal in 1983, former section
17204, in language identical to that still found in section 24345, pro-
vided that no deduction was allowed for "taxes on or according to
or measured by income or profits" imposed by authority of a foreign
country.' 9 The existence of this key identical language in sections 17204
and 24345 often led the Board and the courts to the conclusion that
the interpretation of this language in one section controlled in the
interpretation of the other.2 However, this common approach to both
statutes may no longer be appropriate in all circumstances. Section
17220, which in 1983 replaced section 17204, now more closely
resembles the predecessor to section 24345, which disallowed as a
deduction only taxes "on income or profits," than it does the pre-
sent version of section 24345. Thus, an issue exists with respect to
whether section 17220 which now denies a deduction for "foreign
income" taxes should be interpreted differently than its predecessor,
section 17204, and differently from section 24345, both of which deny
a deduction for taxes "on or according to or measured by income
or profits" imposed by authority of a foreign country.
THE DEFINITION OF AN INCOME TAx
A. Introduction
The question of when a foreign tax is "on or according to or
measured by income" has generated a small body of case law in the
California appellate courts, and a modest number of opinions by the
Board. Indeed, this question has generated as much California law
as any issue surrounding the treatment of foreign income taxes.
The deductibility of a foreign tax is determined by an examination
of the nature of the tax. Prior to the 1977 decision of the California
Supreme Court in Beamer v. Franchise Tax Board,2' the majority of
19. Prior to its repeal by 1983 CAL. STAT. c. 488, operative for taxable years beginning
on or after January 1, 1983, section 17204 provided in pertinent part:
(c) No deduction shall be allowed for the following taxes:
(2) Taxes on or according to or measured by income or profits paid or accrued
within the taxable year imposed by the authority of any of the following:
(A) The government of the United States or any foreign country ...
20. For example, in MCA, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 115 Cal. App. 3d 185, 193, 171
Cal. Rptr. 242, 247 (1981), the Court of Appeal concluded that " '[s]ince these statutes are
obviously in pari materia, the interpretation of a sentence in one controls the interpretation
of virtually the same sentence in the other.' In re Phyle, 30 Cal. 2d 838, 845, 186 P.2d 134
(1947)." The common interpretation of these corresponding sections of the Personal Income
Tax law and the Bank and Corporation Tax Law will be discussed in the following section.
21. 19 Cal. 3d 467, 138 Cal. Rptr. 199, 563 P.2d 238 (1977).
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the decisions of the Board had focused upon the issue of whether
the tax was being imposed on "income" instead of being imposed
upon a return of capital. A tax imposed on a return of capital can-
not be an "income" tax because a return of capital does not con-
stitute income to the recipient. Thus, the payment of a tax imposed
upon a return of capital is generally a deductible tax under section
2434.5 because a tax on a return of capital is not an income tax.
After Beamer, however, the focus of the opinions of the Board in
this area shifted to an inquiry of whether the tax was imposed on
gross income under the general income tax law.22 The consequence
of this analytical approach is that a tax imposed on gross income
is an "income" tax made nondeductible by section 24345.
The following discussion traces the development of these theories
before the Board and in the California courts, with emphasis on the
key judicial decisions in the area.23 A discussion also follows concer-
ning the issue of the degree of realization required in order to generate
"income" as that term is used in section 24345.
B. The Guettler and Meltzer Decisions
Some insight into the current meaning of "income" for purposes
of section 24345 may be gained from an examination of how that
term has been interpreted in the past. The meaning of "income" was
first discussed in depth by the Board not under section 24345, but
under former section 17305 of the Personal Income Tax Law. In the
companion cases of Appeal of Georgica Guettler and Appeal of
Meltzer,24 both decided in 1953, the Board held that taxes imposed
upon a California resident under the Canadian Income War Tax Act
were not limited to income or profits, but were imposed to some extent
upon gross receipts. The Board concluded the tax imposed upon gross
receipts was deductible under former section 17305 because the tax
on gross receipts was not a tax imposed on "income. ' 2
The subject of Guettler and Meltzer was the deductibility of taxes
22. Id. at p. 479.
23. Perhaps the small number of California court decisions addressing the treatment of
foreign taxes can be explained, in part, by the fact that a taxpayer's recourse to the courts
is limited in the sense that a deficiency assessment cannot be challenged in court without first
making payment to the Franchise Tax Board. After payment of the assessment, plus interest,
and the filing and denial of a claim for refund, a taxpayer may then bring a suit for refund
against the Franchise Tax Board for the recovery of the whole or any part of the amount
paid. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE, §§19081-92, and 26101-97.
24. Geuttler, CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., April 1, 1953, CCH Cal. Tax. Reports 200-212;
Meltzer, Id., 1213.
25. Id.
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paid pursuant to section 27(1) of the Canadian Income War Tax Act,
which imposed a special tax on nonresidents. The measure of that
tax was the gross amount of rents, royalties and similar payments
for anything used or sold in Canada. The taxpayer in Guettler claimed
the Canadian tax paid as a deduction against her California personal
income tax where the Canadian tax had been imposed upon income
from patent royalties received from Canadian licensees. The taxpayers
in Meltzer claimed a deduction against their California personal in-
come tax for the Canadian tax imposed upon rental income received
from an interest in Canadian real estate.
The Board concluded in both Guettler and Meltzer that the mean-
ing of the words "income or profits" as used in section 17305 was
to be determined by the criteria of "our" general revenue law. Under
that criteria, the Board noted "income" includes only gain or profits
and excludes receipts which constitute a return of capital. 6 The Board
concluded in both opinions that because the Canadian tax could have
been imposed on payments received as consideration for the sale of
property, and that because part of such receipts would represent a
return of'capital, the Canadian tax imposed under Section 27(1) was
not limited to income or profits. 7 Interestingly enough, the fact that
no sale transaction had been taxed in either Guettler or Meltzer
apparently did not enter into the Board's decision that the Canadian
Income War Tax was not an income tax for purposes of former sec-
tion 17305. The fact that the tax could have been imposed on a return
of capital led the Board to conclude the tax was not an income tax.
The Guettler and Meltzer decisions were followed by the Board in
1963 in Appeal of Don Baxter, Inc. 8 The taxpayer in Baxter claimed
deductions under section 24345 for various taxes paid to Brazil, Italy,
Mexico, Argentina, and the Philippines on royalties received from
sources within those countries. The Board in its opinion in Baxter
cited Guettler and Meltzer for the proposition that gross receipts in-
clude a return of capital where such receipts were consideration for
the sale of property, while "income" does not include a return of
capital. 9 The Board then declared in Baxter that the burden of proof
rests upon the taxpayer to prove "the nature of the foreign tax law,"
and that the taxpayer therein had failed to establish that any of the
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., October 21, 1963, CCH Cal. Tax Reports 202-288.
29. Id.
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foreign taxes imposed a tax upon gross receipts as opposed to a tax
on or according to or measured by income.3" Accordingly, the Board
in Baxter denied a deduction under section 24345 for the various
foreign taxes paid. Baxter is a prime example of a burden-of-proof
case in which the taxpayer's failure to prevail may be directly at-
tributable to a failure to establish the nature of the foreign tax.
The Board in 1966 again adhered to its analysis of "income" as
set forth in Guettler and Meltzer, and ruled in Appeal of William
E. and Esperanza B. Mabee3' that the Mexican Income Tax Law on
dividends received from a corporation operating in Mexico was a tax
on income. The opinion concluded that the distributive profits tax
imposed on the dividends, when considered in conjunction with the
entire Mexican Income Tax Law, was a tax on "income" as that
term is generally understood in the United States, "namely, a tax
on gain or profit and not a tax on the return of capital." The Board's
opinion also stressed that receipts which constitute a return of capital
are excluded from the statutory concept of income under Mexican
law. 32
Guettler and Meltzer were again followed by the Board in 1969
in Appeal of R.M. and Kathryn L. Blankenbeckler.33 There the Board
remarked that the mere fact no deductions were allowed under the
Mexican Income Tax Law in arriving at taxable income did not con-
vert a tax on income into a tax on gross receipts. The Board con-
cluded in Blankenbeckler that the Mexican tax imposed upon the tax-
payer's interest income was not a tax imposed upon a return of capital,
but was a tax on income and nondeductible under section 17204. 3"
C. The Shift Away from Guettler and Meltzer
In 1973, the Board in Appeal of Charles T. and Mary R. Haubie3
began to depart from its previous position taken in the Guettler and
Meltzer opinions that the deductibility of foreign income taxes could
be determined by a review of the foreign tax law without reviewing
the specific tax for which a deduction is claimed. As discussed above,
30. Id.
31. CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., January 4, 1966, CCH Cal. Tax Reports 1203-137.
32. Id.
33. Appeal of R.M. and Kathryn L. Blankenbeekler, CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., January
6, 1969, CCH Cal. Tax Reports 202-009.
34. Id.
35. Appeal of Charles T. and Mary R. Haubiel, CAL. ST. BD. OF EQuAL., January 16,
1973, CCH Cal. Tax Reports 204-882.
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Guettler and Meltzer held the Canadian Income War Tax Act to be
a gross receipts tax and not an income tax on the basis of a provi-
sion which taxed gross receipts from the sale of property without a
deduction for cost of goods sold. Neither Guettler nor Meltzer in-
volved any tax withheld from the sale of property. Yet the Board
concluded in those cases the tax was something other than an "in-
come" tax and was a deductible tax, on the basis that Canadian law
imposed a tax upon specific items of gross receipts where payments
received were consideration for the sale of property. The result of
this line of analysis was that the Board, when ruling on the deduc-
tibility of a foreign tax payment, focused upon the general nature
of the foreign tax law instead of upon the specific foreign tax for
which a deduction was claimed. This generalized approach led to
unusual results, as demonstrated by Guettler and Meltzer, where the
portion of the foreign tax law instrumental in having that tax classified
a deductible tax was not even the portion of the foreign tax law under
which the payment had been made and the deduction claimed by the
taxpayers in California.
Haubiel concerned the deductibility of a tax paid under the South
West African Tax Act of 1962 on dividends the taxpayers received
from a South West African corporation. The issue before the Board
was whether the South West African nonresident shareholder's tax
was a tax "on or according to or measured by income or profits."
The taxpayers argued in Haubiel that the nonresident foreign
shareholder's tax was a deductible tax on specific items of gross
receipts. This argument was based upon the fact that the tax was
imposed not only upon cash dividends, but also upon stock dividends
and the full amount of annuity payments which constituted a return
of capital as opposed to gross income. The taxpayers argued under
the authority of Guettler and Meltzer that in such circumstances the
tax was a deductible gross receipts tax and not an income tax.36
The Board rejected the argument of the taxpayer in Haubiel by
first noting that the deductions were allowed in Guettler and Meltzer
on the basis of a foreign tax law which imposed a tax upon specific
items of gross receipts. Where payments were consideration for the
sale of property, then a part of those receipts represented a return
of capital. However, the Board in Haubiel also noted that in neither
Guettler (involving royalties) nor Meltzer (involving rents) did the tax-
payers pay any tax on the sale of property. The Board then held
36. Id.
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in Haubiel that notwithstanding the fact the South West African
Income Tax could be imposed on annuities or stock dividends, the
specific tax for which the taxpayers claimed a deduction was an
application of that foreign tax to cash dividends paid out of earn-
ings. The Board concluded that the tax on cash dividends paid was
clearly a tax on income and was not a deductible tax under section
17204. 37
Haubiel was followed by Appeal of Lloyd W. and Ruth Bochner,3'
a 1974 decision in which the Board expressly overruled those por-
tions of Guettler and Meltzer which took the overly broad approach
of classifying an entire section of a foreign tax law on the basis of
the characteristics of a portion of that law not even at issue. The
taxpayers in Bochner had claimed a deduction for the amount of tax
withheld under the Canadian Income Tax Act from cash dividends,
distributions from an estate, and interest from Canadian sources. The
Board concluded that with respect to the dividend income, the
payments fit within the concept of income because under Canadian
law the payments could only have been paid out of the company's
profits. The Board also concluded the tax paid on the estate distribu-
tions was also a tax on income because Canadian law excluded capital
payments from taxable estate distributions. Finally, the Board ruled
the interest income did not include an element of capital, but was
income earned from invested capital, and was also a nondeductible
tax measured by income instead of by gross receipts.3 9
Thus, by 1974, the Board opinions had begun to focus upon two
principles. First, the Board had settled upon a procedural approach
to the issue which called for the deductibility of a foreign tax to be
determined by looking to the specific foreign tax on the specific item
in issue. This is in contrast to the approach taken in the earlier Board
decisions where a general examination was made of how the foreign
tax law conceivably could be applied. Second, the Board had settled
upon a substantive approach to the issue which focused upon the
distinction between the receipt of income and the return of capital.
The Beamer decision in 1977 was to emphasize this distinction by
comparing gross receipts with gross income.
37. Id.
38. Appeal of Lloyd W. and Ruth Bochner, CAL. ST. BD. oF EQUAL., May 15, 1974, CCH
Cal. Tax Reports 1205-094.
39. Id.
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D. Beamer and MCA and the Focus on Gross Income
In 1977, the California Supreme Court decided Beamer v. Fran-
chise Tax Board,4" a decision that to some degree reshaped the Board's
previous line of analysis for determining whether a tax was or was
not a nondeductible foreign income tax. In Beamer, a California resi-
dent taxpayer paid a Texas "occupation tax" on the business of pro-
ducing natural gas and crude petroleum. The amount of the tax was
a specified percentage of the "market value" of all the oil and gas
"as and when produced," and was levied upon all producers and
purchasers of oil and gas in Texas. The Texas statute provided that
when the minerals were sold for cash only, the tax was to be com-
puted upon the producer's gross cash receipts. The taxpayers in Beamer
received only royalty income from Exxon Corporation, who was the
operator of the field of which the taxpayer's land was a part. Exxon
had purchased for cash the oil and gas that was the taxpayer's share
under the oil and gas lease, and had collected for Texas the
"occupation" tax on the taxpayer's interest by deducting the amount
of the tax from the purchase price of the minerals.41
The position taken by the Franchise Tax Board in Beamer was that
because the measure of the tax was the proceeds from the sales to
Exxon, which was also the amount of the taxpayers' royalty income,
the occupation tax was, in effect, "measured by" that income and
not deductible under section 17204. The taxpayers argued the pro-
ceeds from the sales to Exxon constituted gross receipts and that under
general tax law, gross receipts from the production of oil and gas
are not the same as the gross income from such production.42
The California Supreme Court in Beamer read the statutory
language, "taxes on or according to or measured by income," in sec-
tion 17204 to use the term "income" in the sense of "gross income
under general tax law as currently operating. ' 43 The court held the
Texas "occupation tax" was not a tax "on or according to or measured
by income" and thus, was deductible under section 17204 because
it was measured by gross receipts instead of gross income. The court
in reaching this conclusion reasoned that the taxpayers were to be
treated as if they were in the business of mining because the Texas
40. Beamner v. Franchise Tax Board, 19 Cal. 3d 467, 138 Cal. Rptr. 199, 563 P.2d 238 (1977).
41. Id. at 470, 475-76, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 199, 203, 563 P.2d at 238, 242.
42. Id. at 476, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 203-04, 563 P.2d at 242-43.
43. Id. at 479, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 206, 563 P.2d at 245.
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tax was imposed upon them as "producers" of oil and gas. The court
looked to the regulations of both the Franchise Tax Board and the
Internal Revenue Service which provided that gross income in a
manufacturing, merchandising or mining business is defined as the
"total sales, less the cost of goods sold." As applied to the mining
business, the court concluded these regulations meant that "lifting
costs" incurred in the production of oil and gas were required to
be subtracted from the gross receipts in order to determine gross in-
come. However, because such costs were not deducted from the gross
receipts in order to compute the Texas tax, the court concluded in
Beamer that the Texas tax was not measured by income and was deduc-
tible under section 17204.1 4
The Supreme Court decision in Beamer was first addressed by the
Board in Appeal of MCA, Inc.," where the Board concluded that
Beamer required the Board to modify its previous approach for deter-
mining whether a foreign tax is "on or according to or measured
by income." The Board in MCA declared that under Beamer, the
initial inquiry must be whether the foreign income received by the
taxpayer falls within the definition of gross income under "our"
general revenue law as currently operating. If the income does con-
stitute gross income as defined by "our" tax law, then the Board
concluded the inquiry ceases and the foreign tax must be considered
a tax "on or according to or measured by income" regardless of the
composition of the item taxed. If, on the other hand, the foreign
tax is imposed on gross receipts, including a return of capital, the
Board concluded the tax will not be considered a tax "on or accor-
ding to or measured by income."" Thus, the Board concluded in
MCA, and again in Appeal of Paramount Pictures Corp."' that foreign
taxes paid are not deductible under section 24345 where such taxes
are imposed on or measured by gross income rather than gross receipts.
The inquiry is to be made under principles of California tax law.
The decision of the Board in Appeal of MCA, Inc. was challenged
by the taxpayer, who brought an action in superior court against the
Franchise Tax Board to recover taxes paid. The trial court concluded
the foreign taxes were not deductible under section 24345 and entered
44. Id. at 476-80, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 203-06, 563 P.2d at 242-45.
45. Appeal of MCA, Inc., CAL. ST. BD. oF EQUAL., October 18, 1977, CCH Cal. Tax
Reports 205-790.
46. Id.
47. Appeal of Paramount Pictures Corp., CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., August 18, 1890, CCH
Cal. Tax Reports 206-433.
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judgment for the Franchise Tax Board. The taxpayer appealed, and
in 1981 the Court of Appeal in MCA, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board
affirmed the decision of the trial court. 48
The Court of Appeal in MCA addressed two contentions raised
by the taxpayer. First, the taxpayer argued that Beamer was not con-
trolling for purposes of determining the deductibility of a foreign in-
come tax under section 24345 paid by a corporate taxpayer. This argu-
ment was based upon the factual distinction that Beamer was decid-
ed under section 17204 of the Personal Income Tax Law. The tax-
payer contended that notwithstanding Beamer, the only foreign taxes
made nondeductible by section 24345 were those imposed on a tax
base comparable to the California income tax, i.e., net income taxes.
The Court of Appeal in MCA rejected this argument, and recognized
that both the Personal Income Tax Law and the Bank and Corpora-
tion Tax Law contain definitions of gross income which are identical
in pertinent part. Accordingly, the court concluded that the deduc-
tibility of foreign income taxes under section 24345 is governed by
the rule stated in Beamer which was decided under section 17204,
and foreign income taxes are not deductible if they are taxes on or
measured by gross income. 49
The second contention raised by the taxpayer in MCA was whether
the taxes in issue were gross receipts taxes and deductible, or taxes
measured by gross income and not deductible. The court noted that
under California tax law, gross income includes all income unless ex-
pressly excluded by law. The court found the taxpayer had made no
showing of any "cost of goods sold," and for this reason the tax-
payer's "gross income" and "gross receipts" from rents and royalties
were the same. Accordingly, the court concluded that the gross ren-
tals and royalties of MCA's gross income and the Canadian tax im-
posed upon them was a tax on or measured by income made nondeduc-
tible by section 24345 and Beamer. The court stressed this result was
not changed by the fact that MCA could recoup the costs of wasting
assets used in generating the income, because a deduction from gross
income in computing net income is permitted pursuant to statute. 0
The distinction between a tax imposed on gross income as opposed
to a tax imposed on gross receipts was also discussed recently by the
Court of Appeal in Robinson v. Franchise Tax Board.5' The plain-
48. MCA, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 115 Cal. App. 3d 185, 199, 171 Cal. Rptr.
242, 250 (1981).
49. Id. at 192-96, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 246-49.
50. Id. at 196-99, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50.
51. Robinson v. Franchise Tax Board, 120 Cal. App. 3d 72, 171 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1981).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 17
tiffs in Robinson were California residents and beneficiaries of a
Hawaii trust who claimed a deduction for purposes of California in-
come tax for the amounts paid by the trust under a "Hawaii General
Excise Tax." The Hawaii tax was multifaceted in its application. As
applied to retail sales, the excise tax was a sales tax not measured
by gross income. As applied to mining activities, the tax was a gross
receipts tax, rather than a gross income tax, similar to that considered
in Beamer.12
The taxpayers contended in Robinson that the Hawaii tax must be
characterized, without reference to its specific application, as a gross
receipts tax. The argument was based upon the theory that the tax
measured the income to be taxed without the deduction of costs or
expenses, regardless of the nature of the business enterprise taxed.
The Robinson court rejected the contention that the Hawaii tax must
be examined in terms of its general application, and found the tax
must be analyzed "by reference to the specific income activity taxed." 3
This focus on the application of the Hawaii tax to the specific tax
on the particular item in issue is consistent with the approach adopted
by the Board in Haubiel.
With respect to the argument that the Hawaii tax was a tax on
gross receipts, the Court noted the taxpayer's income in issue was
primarily derived from interest, real property rents, and royalties from
"rock sales." The court found the rental and interest income were
items specifically listed in the California and federal statutes defining
gross income. No deduction is required from interest income before
the interest income can be included in gross income, and the court
noted that rent, by definition, excludes a return of capital or cost
of goods sold. Thus, the Court found immaterial the fact that the
Hawaii law did not permit a deduction of such items from rent.14
The Court in Robinson also found that if the taxpayer's royalties
from "rock sales" were part of a mining activity, then gross income
as d'fined by statute should exclude cost of goods sold. Thus, if the
Hawaii tax was imposed upon a mining activity and no deduction
was allowed from gross proceeds for cost of goods sold, then the
Hawaii tax would be imposed on gross receipts, not gross income,
and would be deductible in California because the Hawaii tax would
52. Id. at 79-81, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 440-42.
53. Id. at 80-81, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 441-42.
54. Id. at 81-82, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
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not be an "income" tax. However, the Court held that the taxpayers
had failed to carry their burden of showing the Hawaii tax was
imposed on a mining activity within the meaning of Hawaii tax law.
Accordingly, the Court concluded the Hawaii taxes paid on the tax-
payers' income from interest, real property rents and royalties were
nondeductible income taxes under section 17204. 55
The most recent decision regarding the distinction between gross
income and gross receipts, and the most recent decision by the Board
regarding foreign income taxes, is Appeal of Huntington Alloys, Inc."
Huntington Alloys involved the deductiblity under section 24345 of
amounts paid for Ontario and Manitoba mining taxes. Under the
Ontario mining tax law, a tax was imposed at three graduated rates
on profits determined by deducting specified mining expenses from
the gross revenue from production. The gross revenue was determin-
ed by one of three methods. If the ore was sold, gross revenue was
the gross receipts from the sale of the ore. If the ore was processed
at the mine, gross revenue was the amount of the actual market value
of the output at the mouth of the mine. If the ore was processed
at the mine and there was no means of ascertaining the actual market
value of the output at the mouth of the mine, gross revenue was
the amount at which the mine assessor appraised, such output. The
provisions of the Manitoba mining tax law were substantially similiar
in their application to those of the Ontario mining tax. 57
The issue raised in Huntington Alloys was whether the Ontario and
Manitoba mining taxes, which did not allow a deduction for cost deple-
tion, were taxes measured by gross receipts rather than by gross in-
come. The taxpayer argued the regulation of the Franchise Tax Board
which defined "gross income" as the total sales, less cost of goods
sold, excluded from the calculation of the cost of goods sold only
percentage depletion. Thus, the taxpayer argued that the regulation
recognized cost depletion as a component of the cost of goods sold
in the mining industry. The taxpayer's argument concluded that because
the California tax scheme required the subtraction of the cost of goods
sold from gross receipts to calculate gross income, and because the
foreign mining laws did not allow a deduction for cost depletion that
was a part of cost of goods sold under the California tax scheme,
55. Id. at 82-83 174 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
56. Appeal of Huntington Alloys, Inc., Cal. St. Bd. of Equal., September 12, 1984, CCH
Cal. Tax Reports 400-493.
57. Id.
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the foreign mining taxes were taxes on gross receipts instead of taxes
on gross income.58
The Board in Huntington Alloys rejected these arguments and rul-
ed the California regulation provided that in the mining business, items
not ordinarily used in computing the cost of goods sold cannot be
subtracted in determining gross income. The Board declared that if
cost depletion was not ordinarily used by the taxpayer in its com-
putation of cost of goods sold, then allowance of such a deduction
was not necessary for the foreign mining tax law to be classified as
a tax measured by gross income. The Board concluded the taxpayer
had made no showing that its accounting method normally included
cost depletion in the computation of cost of goods sold. According-
ly, the Board held the taxpayer had failed to carry the burden of
demonstrating the mining taxes were measured by gross receipts which
included, as did the Texas tax in Beamer, a direct return of capital
invested as cost of goods sold."9
E. A Current Approach to a Definition of "Income" as
Opposed to A Return of Capital
Perhaps the most appropriate place to begin an examination of the
current approach to a definition of "income" as opposed to a return
of capital is with the early decisions in Guettler and Meltzer. Three
points require emphasis. First, these opinions by the Board recogniz-
ed the fundamental principle of tax law that "income" by definition
includes only gain and excludes receipts which constitute a return of
capital. This principle remains valid, and consistently has been followed
in all subsequent opinions by the Board. Second, an analysis of a
foreign tax law must focus on the specific tax and item in question.
According to the original approach followed by the Board, the deter-
mination of income versus return of capital was to be made on the
basis of a review of the foreign tax law without reference to the specific
portion of the tax law at issue in the case. This broad approach typified
by Guettler and Meltzer was curtailed by the Board in Haubiel and
its progeny in favor of an analysis which looked to the specific tax
and item under review.
The third point to be emphasized is that the analysis of the foreign
tax law should focus upon whether the tax is imposed upon "gross"
58. Id.
59. Id.
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income. The Beamer and MCA opinions clarified the meaning of "in-
come" under section 24345 and former section 17204 by holding the
term meant gross income under the general tax laws as currently
operating. This approach calls for an examination of the nature of
the foreign tax law under federal and California tax law principles,
as opposed to an analysis from the perspective of the tax law of the
foreign country. This approach has been followed by the Board in
all decisions subsequent to Beamer and MCA.
The Beamer and MCA line of analysis relies once again upon the
distinction between income and a return of capital by distinguishing
between gross income and gross receipts. "Gross receipts" is a broader
term than gross income, and is generally used to describe gross pro-
ceeds which include a return of capital in the form of cost of goods
sold or the equivalant.6 ° Gross income, in contrast, is defined by statute
and regulation in California and does not include a return of capital.
Section 2427161 defines gross income under the Bank and Corpora-
tion Tax law in terms substantially identical to those found under
the federal statutory definition of gross income in Section 61 of the
Internal Revenue Code. At one time, regulations promulgated by the
Franchise Tax Board62 interpreted and defined many aspects of sec-
tion 24271. However, the majority of those regulations were repealed
in 198263 and regulations promulgated under the Internal Revenue
Code were incorporated by reference into California Tax Law in in-
stances where the Bank and Corporation Tax Law conforms to the
Internal Revenue Code.6" The remaining regulations promulgated by
the Franchise Tax Board under section 24271 remain in effect. Ex-
cept for certain provisions relating to capital assets and individuals,
these remaining regulations are substantially the same as the federal
60. See 1 Mertens, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION, §5.10; see also Appeal of MCA, Inc.,
CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., October 18, 1977, CCH Cal. Tax Reports 205-790, n.3.
61. Added by STATS. 1955, p. 1578, in effect June 6, 1985. Based on former §23851a. Amended
by STATS. 1963, p. 2305.
62. The Franchise Tax Board if empowered, pursuant to Rav. & TAx CODE, §23004, to
issue regulations with respect to the Bank and Corporation Tax Law.
63. Title 18, CAL. ADimi. CODE, §§24271(a)-(c), 24271(0 and 24271(g) were repealed by
Repealer filed September 3, 1982, effective the thirtieth day thereafter (Register 82, No. 37).
64. Id. §26422 provides in full: "In the absence of regulations of the Franchise Tax Board
and unless otherwise specifically provided, in cases where the Bank and Corporation Tax Law
conforms to the Internal Revenue Code, regulations under the Internal Revenue Code shall,
insofar as possible, govern the interpretation of conforming state statutes, with due account
for state terminology, state effective dates, and other obvious differences between state and
federal law pertaining to, but not limited to, such matters as tax rates, income and taxable
years, jurisdiction, and cross-references to other related statutes and regulations." (New section
filed September 30, 1975 (Register 75, No. 40).)
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regulations promulgated for Internal Revenue Code section 61.16 Thus,
the California definition of gross income, with minor exceptions, con-
forms to the federal definition, and federal law will be relevant in
interpreting the meaning of gross income for California tax purposes.
As can be seen in recent decisions of the Board such as Huntington
Alloys, as well as in recent judicial decisions such as MCA and Robin-
son, much of the analysis in this area now consists of a formalistic
approach as to whether the foreign tax was imposed upon gross in-
come as defined under California tax law. A recurring point in such
decisions is whether the taxpayer has carried the burden of
demonstrating that the foreign tax falls on something other than gross
income. The significance of the burden-of-proof issue cannot be
overemphasized, for this issue is one of the most important themes
consistently running through the decisional law in this area by both
the Board and the courts.
In summary, the framework is now firmly in place to distinguish
between a foreign tax on gross income and a foreign tax on a return
of capital. Only the latter would qualify as a deductible tax under
section 24345. In situations where this issue will subsequently arise,
the analysis should focus upon the factual nature of the foreign tax
and the item in issue, and whether the taxpayer has carried the burden
of characterizing the foreign tax as something other than a tax on
or according to or measured by gross income. Other issues which sur-
round the meaning of "income" for purposes of section 24345 are
far less settled than the gross income- gross receipts distinction, and
the majority of future controversy and litigation in this area will most
likely center upon these other issues.
F. The Need for Realization and Economic Gain
A major unsettled issue surrounding the interpretation of section
24345 is the relationship between income and realization, and the need
for economic gain. Specifically, the issue presented in several of the
more recent decisions by the Board and the courts is whether there
can be "income" without realization or economic gain.
Generally speaking, it is a well recognized principle of tax law that
a mere increase in the value of property is not income, but only an
unrealized increase in capital." Among the policy justifications com-
65. Id. §§24271(d) on Gains Derived From Dealings in Property, 24271(e) on Interest,
and 24271(h) on Income From Discharge of Indebtedness are substantially the same as TREAS.
R G. §1.61 (1957).
66. 1 Mertens, LAw OF FEDERAL INCo E TAXATiON, §5.05.
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monly advanced for taxing only realized income are that (1) a tax
on an unrealized increment in value would be awkward from the
administrative point of view, (2) the tax ordinarily would be a hard-
ship for the taxpayer who would not have a source from which the
tax could be paid, and (3) the tax might result in deductions for losses
as yet unrealized. 7
The concept of "realization" seems to defy precise definition, and
definitional problems are usually resolved in the narrow context of
the facts present in a specific case. For example, the Court in Beamer
was presented with the argument that the term "gross income" in-
cludes any economic benefit received by a taxpayer and the reduction
to possession of oil and gas by the taxpayers therein constituted gross
income. The Court rejected this argument and stated that while the
types of events which constitute realization have been expanded over
the years, the requirement that there be such an event before income
arises for tax purposes has been emphasized in case law for many
years.68
The most expansive discussion of the issue of realization and
economic gain, with regard to the deductibility of foreign taxes, is
the decision of the Board in Appeal of Occidental Petroleum.69
Occidental Petroleum involved the deductibility under section 24345
of payments made by the taxpayer to Libya. The taxpayer's combined
report"O filed in California for 1970 claimed a deduction for a part
of the taxes paid to Libya in that year by Occidental Petroleum's
unitary subsidiary, Occidental of Libya, Inc. ("Oxy Libya"). The
amount deducted was the portion of Libyan taxes based on the "posted
price" of Libyan crude oil, to the extent that this posted price ex-
ceeded the actual market price for which Libyan crude oil was sold.
The taxpayer contended that a tax based upon an artifical figure as
the posted price, which bore no relationship to the actual gross receipts
Oxy Libya realized from the sale of Libyan crude oil, was deductible
67. Id.
68. Beamer v. Franchise Tax Board, 19 Cal. 3d 467, 478-79, 138 Cal. Rptr. 199, 205-06,
563 P.2d 238, 244-45 (1977).
69. Appeal of Occidental Petroleum Corp., CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., June 21, 1983, CCH
Cal. Tax Reports 400-394.
70. The "combined report" in California describes the procedure of culminating the results
of commonly controlled legal entities engaged in a single unitary business into a single report. The
combined report is not a return, and is used to determine the proper amount of income reportable
by each entity engaged in a single unitary business and includible in its individual return. Miller,
WORLD VDE UNITARY COMBINATION: THE CALIFORNIA PRACTICE, CH. 4 THE STATE CORPORA-
TION INCo~m TAX (C. E. McLure Jr., ed., 1984) pp. 132, 136.
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under section 24345 because the tax was not a tax on or according
to or measured by income or profits.7
In the opinion, the Board stated that under the Libyan tax scheme
for the pertinent years, the Libyan Petroleum Law and the Conces-
sion Form required all oil companies operating in Libya to pay "such
income tax and other taxes and imposts as are payable under the
laws of Libya." They also required that if the total annual fees, rents,
income tax, other direct taxes and royalties paid by the oil company
to Libya fell short of fifty percent of profits from all its petroleum
concessions in Libya, the company was required to pay Libya a "sur-
tax" sufficient to make its total payments equal to fifty percent of
its profits. For this purpose, "profits" were defined as the income
resulting to the company from its operations in Libya after deduct-
ing certain enumerated expenses.72
The Libyan Concession Form defined "income resulting from the
operations of the company in Libya" to include the total gross receipts
realized by the company from the export of Libyan crude oil. However,
such receipts could not be less than the amount which resulted from
multiplying the number of barrels of such crude oil exported by the
applicable posted price per barrel of crude oil exported (less certain
marketing allowances). The Board stated in the opinion that during
the years in issue, Libya was unilaterally fixing the posted price without
regard to the actual market prices for oil and that for 1970, the average
posted price was approximately $0.50 per barrel higher than the ac-
tual market price. 71
The Board in Occidental Petroleum agreed for two reasons with
the taxpayer's argument that the Libyan tax based upon the difference
between the posted price and the amount Oxy Libya actually received
from their sales of Libyan crude oil was not a tax on income. First,
the Board stated that in order to have gross income, a taxpayer must
first receive "economic gain" in some form. The Board found that
Oxy Libya did not obtain any economic benefit or gain from "a purely
fictitious amount of Libyan 'income' which the company never receiv-
ed. Thus, to the extent the Libyan tax was imposed on the difference
between the posted price and the actual sales price of Libyan crude
oil, the Board concluded that the Libyan tax was levied upon an ar-
71. Appeal of Occidental Petroleum Corp., CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., June 21, 1983, CCH
Cal. Tax Reports 400-394.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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tificial tax base and was not a tax on or measured by "income" as
that term is used "in general United States tax law.""7
In addition, the Board concluded in Occidental Petroleum that the
Libyan tax was not imposed on "realized" income. Since the "in-
come" subject to the tax could not be less than the number of barrels
of crude oil exported multiplied by the posted price, the Libyan tax
could be triggered by the export of crude oil regardless of whether
a sale or other disposition had taken place. The Board found the
mere act of exporting oil did not constitute a sufficient realization
of income for general tax purposes. The Board in reaching this con-
clusion rejected the argument of the Franchise Tax Board that any
increase in the posted price by Libya over the prevailing market price
constituted, in substance, nothing more than a method for Libya to
increase the rate of tax and royalities of oil concessionaires without
violating the resource concession agreements signed by the companies."
The issue of realization was also discussed in the context of foreign
taxes in the recent decision of the Board in Appeal of Huntington
Alloys, Inc." There the Board recognized the Ontario and Manitoba
mining taxes in issue were multifaceted and provided three alternative
ways to tax one business. The Board concluded that no income was
realized at the point at which both mining taxes imposed a tax on
unsold inventory under one of the alternatives. Thus, the Board reason-
ed the taxes should have been deductible under section 24345 because
they were not measured by income to the extent they were imposed
on unsold ore. Nevertheless, the taxpayer was denied a deduction
because the Board reasoned the taxpayer had not demonstrated which
portion of the mining taxes paid, if any, actually had been imposed
upon unsold ore."
Several conclusions may be drawn from the opinions in Occidental
Petroleum and Huntington Alloys. First, the Board has concluded
that the concept of gross income is premised upon gain and that
without such a gain there is no "income" for purposes of defining
a nondeductible "income" tax under section 24345. A second con-
clusion to be drawn is that the Board is of the opinion that income




76. CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., September 12, 1984, CCH Cal. Tax Reports 1400-493.
77. Id.
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The Board in Occidental Petroleum relied to a substantial degree
on Rev. Rul. 78-6378 in reaching the conclusion that the act of
exporting oil does not constitute a sufficient realization of income
for general income tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 78-63 was also relied upon
by the Board in reaching its conclusion in Occidental Petroleum that
the Libyan petroleum tax was not a tax on or according to or measured
by "income" to the extent the tax was levied upon an artificial base
as calculated by the differential between the posted price and the actual
sales price of Libyan crude oil. However, Rev. Rul. 78-63 is no longer
followed at the federal level, which raises an issue regarding the con-
tinued vitality of the Occidental Petroleum opinion.
As will be discussed in the following section, the Treasury in late
1983 issued final regulations regarding the creditability of a foreign
tax under sections 901 and 903 of the Internal Revenue Code. A por-
tion of the final regulations state that the "realization" requirement
for a creditable income tax may be satisfied by a transfer, processing
or export of readily marketable property."9 This broadening of the
concept of "realization" clearly is contrary to the conclusion of both
Rev. Rul. 78-63 and Occidental Petroleum that the mere export of
oil does not constitute sufficient realization to amount to "income."
Perhaps in response to the final regulations, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice has now declared Rev. Rul. 78-63 obsolete and no longer deter-
minative with respect to future transactions."
Notwithstanding the fact that the Franchise Tax Board has not
adopted the final treasury regulations on the federal foreign tax credit,
those regulations which recognize income even in the absence of tradi-
tional "realization" cast doubt upon the position of the Board that
no income will be found without realization. In contrast to the
previously discussed issue of whether a foreign tax is imposed upon
gross profits or gross receipts, the issues of realization and economic
gain may be the cause of future litigation because of their unsettled
nature. The ability of foreign nations to reshape their tax laws also
suggests a virtually unlimited number of variations on the issue of
how a foreign tax can be classified for purposes of section 24345.
The analysis of these issues is also complicated by the fact that the
concession or operating agreements between the host country and the
taxpayer often are drafted to provide special tax treatment for the
78. REv. RuL. 78-63, 1978-1 C.B. 228.
79. Treas. Reg. 1985 §1.901-2(b)(2)(i).
80. REv. RuL. 84-171, I.R.B. 1984-50, 37.
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taxpayer's operations. An illustration of a major reason for a foreign
government and a taxpayer to structure such an agreement or law
is to allow the taxpayer to successfully claim a foreign tax credit for
federal income tax purposes."1
The distinction between form and substance should also be kept
in mind in analyzing the nature of a foreign tax, and this distinction
appears particularly applicable to issues surrounding realization. For
example, the Franchise Tax Board argued in Occidental Petroleum
that the manipulation of the posted price constituted, in substance,
nothing more than a method for Libya to increase the rate of tax
and royalties on oil concessionaires without violating the concession
agreements.8" While the Franchise Tax Board did not prevail on this
argument in that case, the Board did not quarrel with the general
proposition that substance governs form in matters of taxation.83 The
distinction between substance and form becomes more significant when
considered in conjunction with the purpose of section 24345. As stated
by the Court of Appeal in MCA, the purpose of the amendment
adding to section 24345 the language "on or according to or measured
by income or profits" was to make nondeductible all taxes measured
by income, no matter what they are levied upon.8" MCA declared
it was not necessary for the tax to be on income, as long as the tax
was "measured" by income. Accordingly, the fact that a foreign tax
does not bear the form of a tax on income under principles of Califor-
nia and United States tax law does not necessarily answer the true
issue of whether the substance of that foreign tax establishes a tax
which is on or according to or measured by income or profits.
No general rule has been created which will resolve all of the issues
surrounding the relationship of economic gain and realization to "in-
come" under section 24345. One general rule of analysis that can
81. For a discussion of the Internal Revenue Service rulings on the creditability of purported
payments of income tax under production sharing agreements between a U.S. oil company and
the Indonesian government, and the negotiations which resulted in a new production sharing agree-
ment that received the approval from the Service in Rev. Rul. 78-222, see Isenbergh, The Foreign
Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies and Creditable Taxes, 39 TAx L. REv. 227, 254, (1984).
82. Appeal of Occidental Petroleum Corp., CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., June 21, 1983, CCH
Cal. Tax Reports 400-394.
83. Id. The Board has also recognized in numerous other decisions that substance governs
over form in matters of taxation. Recent examples include Appeal of Donald E. and Judith
E. Liederman, CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., October 26, 1983, CCH Cal. Tax Reports 400-210,
and Appeal of Paul and Nancy Falkenstein, CAL. ST. BD. oF EQUAL., February 1, 1983, CCH
Cal. Tax Reports 400-388, in which the Board looked to the decisions in Commissioner v.
Court Holding Company 324 U.S. 331 (1945), and Gregory v. Helverling 293 U.S. 465 (1934)
for the same principle under federal tax law.
84. MCA, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board, 115 Cal. App.3d 185, 194, 171 Cal. Rptr. 242,
248 (1981).
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be suggested is that where a foreign tax law attempts to place the
incidence of tax upon an event other than a traditional event of realiza-
tion, the Board has indicated in the Occidental Petroleum and Hun-
tington Alloys decisions that no "income" is generated and any foreign
tax imposed upon that "income" may qualify for a deduction under
section 24345 as a tax on something other than income. However,
the fact the Occidental Petroleum and Huntington Alloys opinions
were decided by the Board, not a court, must also enter into the assess-
ment of whether the views expressed in those opinions will prevail
in other disputes involving similar issues. Opinions by the Board are
not controlling in a court proceeding involving the same taxpayer,
another taxpayer, or even the same issues. However, opinions by the
Board which are contemporary administrative constructions of statutes
are entitled to great weight.8" Thus, the significance of the Occiden-
tal Petroleum approach to realization and economic gain may be
somewhat diminished by the fact that opinion does not create binding
precedent to be followed by the courts.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL FOREIGN
TAX CREDIT SCHEME AND THE TREATMENT By CALIFORNIA
OF FOREIGN INCOME TAXES
A. Introduction
As discussed above, section 24345 denies a taxpayer who is subject
to the Bank and Corporation Tax Law a deduction for the payment
of foreign taxes on or according to or measured by income. Unlike
federal law, California law does not currently allow a credit against
tax liability for foreign income taxes paid or accrued, although a credit
was once allowed in California under the Personal Income Tax Law. 86
Apart from this obvious distinction, the California and federal systems
raise a number of parallel issues. For example, both systems require
an analysis of whether a foreign tax is imposed on "income."
However, such an analysis will be quite different for determining
whether a foreign tax is a deductible tax under section 24345 or whether
the foreign tax is a creditable tax under the federal system.
85. See, e.g., Borchers v. Franchise Tax Board, 151 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507, 198 Cal. Rptr. 734,
736 (1984), where the court stated: "Our view is buttressed by a line of decisions of the State Board
of Equalization. Contemporary administrative constructions of statutes are entitled to great weight."
86. A credit for net income taxes paid to a foreign country was allowed by former section
18001 of the Personal Income Tax Law prior to its amendment in 1957. See Appeal of Leman
and Petronella Druyf, CAL. ST. BD. oF EQUAL., March 17, 1964, CCH Cal. Tax Reports 202-412.
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There are two key statutes to the federal tax credit scheme. First,
Internal Revenue Code section 901 provides a credit for the amount
of income, war profits, or excess profits taxes paid or accrued by
or on behalf of a taxpayer to a foreign country or possession of the
United States.87 Second, Internal Revenue Code section 903 provides
that the term "income, war profits, and excess profits taxes" shall
include a tax paid in lieu of a tax on income, war profits, or excess
profits otherwise generally imposed by any foreign country or posses-
sion of the United States.88
B. The Source Principle and Formula Apportionment
A major distinction between the federal and California schemes for
the treatment of foreign income taxes is that the purposes and policies
underlying the two schemes are quite different. In order to under-
stand these differences, an understanding of the manner by which
California measures tax liability under the Bank and Corporation Tax
Law is essential. The reliance by California upon the source princi-
ple, as opposed to residency, to measure the tax base, is a basic dif-
ference between the California and federal schemes.
California provides by statute that when a taxpayer derives income
from sources both within and without Calfornia, the taxpayer is
required to measure California franchise tax liability by net income
"derived from or attributable to sources within California." 8 This
reliance upon a source basis for California taxation, as opposed to
a residence basis which taxes residents on all income earned regardless
of the source, is consistent with the principle that under both the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution,90 a state may not, when
imposing an income tax, "tax value earned outside its borders.'
Difficulties may arise in arriving at a precise territorial allocation
of "value" where an integrated business enterprise is operating in
more than one state. 92 The approach utilized by California to achieve
such a territorial allocation is the unitary business principle. This prin-
ciple is not new, and has been a familiar concept in tax cases for
87. 26 U.S.C. §901(b)(1).
88. Id. §903.
89. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §25101.
90. U.S. CONST. Art. I, sec. 8, cl.3.
91. ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 458 U.S. 307, 320, (1982).92. See Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
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over 50 years.93 The California scheme provides that if a taxpayer
is engaged in a single unitary business with an affiliated corporation
or corporations, the amount of "business income" 94 attributable to
California sources must be determined by applying an apportionment
formula" to the total income derived from the combined unitary opera-
tions of the affiliated companies. 96 Formula apportionment under the
unitary business principle is not used by California alone. All states
which levy corporate income taxes use formula apportionment to some
degree to determine their respective portion of taxable income of a
unitary business which operates both inside and outside their
boundaries.97 More than one test has been recognized for determin-
ing whether a unitary business exists. 9
93. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 452, 473
n.25, 454 n.26, (1978); ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 458 U.S. 307, 320
n.14 (1982).
94. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE, §25120(a), defines "business income" as "income arising from
transactions and activity in the regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business and includes
income from tangible and intangible property if the acquisition, management, and disposition
of the property constitute integral parts of the taxpayer's regular trade or business operations."
"Nonbusiness income" is defined by CAL. Rv. & TAx. CODE, §25120(d), as "all income
other than business income."
95. California in 1966 adopted the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
(UDITPA) which is now found in CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE, §§25120-40. (STATs. 1966, c. 2.)
UDITPA provides for the use of a three factor formula utilizing the average of the taxpayer's
percentage of total payroll, total property, and total sales that are attributable to California.
See Miller, WORLDWIDE UNiTARY COmINATION: TiE CAITORNiA PRACTICE, Cu. 4, THE STATEt
CORPORATION INCOME TAX (C.E. McLure Jr., ed., 1984) pp. 131, 133.
96. See Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947)
and Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 664, 111 P.2d 334, affd. 315 U.S. 501 (1942)
for general discussions of formula apportionment in California as distinguished from the separate
accounting approach. Generally speaking, if business within a state is "truly separate and distinct"
from business outside a state "so that the segregation of income may be made clearly and
accurately," then separate accounting may be used. Butler Brother, supra, at pp. 667-68.
97. The Final Report of the Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group, Chairman's
Report and Supplemental Views (Office of the Secretary, Department of the Treasury, August
1984), p. 1, reported all forty-five states which levy corporate income taxes use formula appor-
tionment to divide the taxable income of a single corporation operating a unitary business across
state or national borders. Roughly one-half of the corporate income tax states, according to
the Final Report, also use the apportionment method to determine their share of the income
of multicompany firms operating across state lines through subsidiaries. These states apply their
apportionment formula to the combined income and business activities of related U.S. cor-
porations forming a unitary business. The Final Report indicated that approximately one-half
of these states that combine domestic corporations engaged in a unitary business also include
foreign corporations that are part of a unitary business in the company's "combined report"
of income. These latter states, which include California, use the so-called worldwide unitary
method of taxation.
98. The California Supreme Court has recognized two tests of unity. Under the "three
unities" test of Butler Brothers, a unitary business is established by the presence of the unities
of ownership, operation, and use. Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 678, 111 P.2d
334, 341, affd. 315 U.S. 501 (1942). Under the "contribution and dependency" test of Edison
California Stores, a business is unitary if the operation of the business done within California
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In contrast to the California scheme of taxing only income derived
from or attributable to sources within California, the United States
as a general rule imposes a federal income tax on domestic corpora-
tions, citizens of the United States wherever resident, and resident
alien individuals, based upon worldwide income without regard for
the source of the income. 99 Taxation based upon residency presents
the possibility of double taxation. For this reason, the primary ob-
jective of the foreign tax credit at the federal level is to prevent double
taxation. The tax credit found in Internal Revenue Code section 901100
is the device designed to eliminate double taxation on income generated
in a "foreign country" as defined by regulations.10'
One commentator has suggested that the chief determinative factor
in deciding whether a tax qualifies for the federal foreign tax credit
should be whether or not the tax is shifted or passed along by the
person paying the tax. 02 Under this theory, double taxation of a tax-
payer's income occurs only if the taxpayer has borne the burden of
both the United States income tax and the foreign tax for which a
credit is claimed. 03 The theory concludes that the federal tax credit
system is based upon assumptions about the economic incidence of
creditable taxes because, strictly speaking, a foreign tax should be
credited only if the taxpayer could demonstrate the incidence of the
foreign tax and of the United States tax against which the credit would
be taxed, and could prove that potential income was in fact reduced
by both taxes.' 04 However, in a purely economic analysis, this distinc-
tion between direct and indirect taxation is often blurred. 0 5
is dependent or contributes to the operation of the business outside of California. Edison Califor-
nia Stores v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 481, 183 Cal. Rptr. 16, 21 (1947). Both these tests
were approved by the United States Supreme Court in Container Corporation of America v.
Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
The United States Supreme Court has also recently alluded to a test of unity based upon
"contributions to income resulting from functional integration, centralization of management,
and economies of scale." Mobil Oil Corporation v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445
U.S. 425, 438 (1980); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department of the State
of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 354, 366 (1982). The Court in Container Corporation most recently
suggested another test of unity when it stated, "The prerequisite to a constitutionally accep-
table finding of unitary business is a flow of value, not a flow of goods." Container Corpora-
tion of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 178 (1983).
99. TanAs. REo. 1.1-1(b)(1956).
100. 26 U.S.C. §901(b)(1) provides a credit to United States income taxpayers for the "amount
of any income, war profits and excess profits taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year
to any foreign country. .... "
101. See Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 677 F.2d 72, 79-80 (Ct. Cl. 1982), and cases
cited therein.
102. OwENs, Tan FOREIGN TAX CREDIT (1961) p. 83.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 83-84.
105. See e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 677 F.2d 72, 82-83 (Ct. Cl. 1982), where
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Thus, the policy behind the federal foreign tax credit is that without
such a credit, double taxation may occur. This policy, however, is
inapplicable to a state system of taxation such as that found in Califor-
nia where tax imposed on a corporate taxpayer is based upon the
source principle instead of residence. Under section 25101, California
taxes only that income which is derived from or attributable to sources
within California. At first glance, California may appear to tax foreign
income either in instances where a corporation subject to the Califor-
nia franchise tax or a unitary subsidiary of a corporation subject to
California franchise tax conducts business and earns income in a
foreign country. However, such foreign income will not be taxed in
California, but the foreign income may be included in the calcula-
tions to determine the amount of the taxpayer's income "derived from
or attributable to sources in California." Accordingly, neither a deduc-
tion nor a credit need be provided by California where a corporate
taxpayer has paid foreign income taxes.
Under a purely economic analysis, the corporate income tax serves
different purposes at the federal and state levels, and these differences
should be reflected in the design of two tax bases, with the state base
including only that income that is sourced within the state.'06 Again,
such a source base need not provide for either a deduction or credit
paid for foreign income taxes, because the foreign income upon which
that foreign tax is based is not being subjected to California tax.
These theoretical justifications for a state tax based upon the source
rule, and for the absence of the need for either a foreign income
the court stated, "every traditionally indirect tax would have some persons who are the first
and final taxpayers, and conversely, every direct tax may on occasion be shifted to another."
The distinction between direct and indirect taxes was explained by John Stuart Mill, as quoted
in Inland Steel as follows: "Taxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one which is
demanded from the very persons who it is intended or desired should pay it. Indirect taxes
are those which are demanded from one person in the expectation and intention that he shall
indemnify himself at the expense of another, such are the excise or customs. The producer
or importer of a commodity is called upon to pay a tax on it, not with the intention to levy
a peculiar contribution upon him, but to tax through him the consumers of the commodity,
from whom it is supposed that he will recover the amount by means of an advance in price."
Id. at 82-83 n.28.
106. See PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PRINCIPLES FOR DIVIDING THE STATE CORPORATE TAX BASE,
C. 6, TiE STATE CORPORATION INCOME TAX (C.E. McClure, Jr., ed., 1984) p. 228. Peggy Musgrave
argues the federal government must have as one of its functions the fair distribution of the
tax burden and for this purpose, income taxes must be applied at the federal level to global
income in accordance with the residence principle. The states, however, do not have a major
distributive function requiring the use of personal income taxation on the residence principle.
Also, Musgrave argues the federal government, not the states, has the primary responsibility
for countercyclical stabilization policy. For these reasons, Musgrave concludes it remains necessary
for the states to apply a different form of corporate tax. Id. at 230-33.
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tax deduction or credit by California, are matters more appropriate
for consideration by an administrative agency such as the Franchise
Tax Board or the California Legislature, than by the Board or the
California courts. California has, by statute, chosen to deny a deduc-
tion (and credit) for foreign taxes paid on or according to or measured
by income or profits. Thus, apart from policy arguments which may
be made, a question remains as to under what circumstances federal
law in this area will be relevant in interpreting section 24345 and the
language of that section that denies a deduction for foreign income
taxes.
C. Internal Revenue Code Section 901 and Section 24345
The fundamental differences in policy underlying the California and
federal corporate tax laws should be kept in mind whenever attemp-
ting to apply precedent involving the creditability of a foreign tax
under federal law to a situation involving the deductibility of a foreign
tax in California under section 24345. However, this is not to suggest
federal precedent cannot be applied in appropriate circumstances to
issues involving the foreign tax deduction under section 24345. For
example, the Board in Appeal of Don Baxter, Inc.' 7 stressed the fact
that the Brazilian tax in question had been ruled an income tax by
the Internal Revenue Service, in concluding the tax was a tax on in-
come for California purposes. A further example is found in Appeal
of Occidental Petroleum Corporation'°8 where the Board virtually
adopted by reference to a revenue ruling the position of the Internal
Revenue Service that the act of exporting oil did not constitute a suf-
ficient realization of income for general income tax purposes.
One of the most striking examples of the differences between the
treatment of a foreign income tax under the federal and California
schemes is found in the recent opinion of the Board in Appeal of
Huntington Alloys, Inc. 09 There the taxpayer argued the Ontario min-
ing tax was measured by gross receipts, not gross income, and was
deductible in California under section 24345. The taxpayer argued
that because the Court of Claims had ruled in Inland Steel"' that
107. Appeal of Don Baxter, Inc., CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., October 21, 1983, CCH Cal.
Tax Reports 202-288.
108. Appeal of Occidental Petroleum Corporation, CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., June 21, 1983,
CCH Cal. Tax Reports 400-394.
109. Appeal of Huntington Alloys, Inc., CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., September 12, 1984,
CCH Cal. Tax Reports 400-439.
110. Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 677 F.2d 72 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
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the same Ontario mining tax was not a creditable income tax under
the Internal Revenue Code, the tax should not be declared an income
tax under section 24345 for California purposes. The Board rejected
this argument and stated that the finding of the Court of Claims that
the Ontario mining tax is not an income tax under federal law "is
not decisive for the purposes of Revenue and Taxation Code section
24345." The Board found that in order to be a creditable income
tax, a foreign tax must reach net gain as that term is understood
in the United States, and Inland Steel was decided on the basis of
what the Court of Claims concluded was the omission from the Ontario
tax of significant costs of the mining business. The Board concluded
in Huntington Alloys that while the absence of these deductions was
significant in Inland Steel in determining the Ontario tax was not a
tax on net income under the Federal standard, their absence was not
determinative in deciding whether that tax was a tax on gross income
under the California standard."'
Huntington Alloys illustrates the worst of all possible worlds for
a taxpayer where a tax is found not to be a creditable income tax
and is denied a federal tax credit, and is found to be an income tax
for California purposes and denied as a deduction. While such a result
may appear incongruous, the result is nothing more than the applica-
tion of differing bodies of law. On the other hand, an income tax
creditable under Internal Revenue code section 901 for federal pur-
poses has in the past often been denied the foreign tax deduction
under section 24345 because of the significant overlap between the
definition of an income tax for federal and California purposes. This
trend may not continue, however, after the advent of the final Regula-
tions issued by Treasury in 1983 in the area of foreign tax credits,
for these regulations magnify the differences between the California
and federal treatment of foreign income taxes.
D. The Impact of the Final Federal Foreign Tax Credit
Regulations on the Treatment of Foreign Income Taxes
By California
The Treasury Department had at various times before 1983 issued
both temporary regulations and proposed regulations with respect to
111. Appeal of Huntington Alloys, Inc., CAL. ST. BD. OF EQUAL., September 12, 1984,
CCH Cal. Tax Reports 1400-439.
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the creditability of foreign taxes under Internal Revenue Code sec-
tions 901 and 903.112 This series of proposed and temporary regula-
tions culminated in the issuance of final Regulations on October 6,
1983.113 The final Regulations are effective for taxable years beginn-
ing after November 14, 1983,114 but a taxpayer may elect to have
them applied to any prior open taxable year on a country-by-country
basis." '5 The election to apply the final Regulations to earlier taxable
years had to have been made by October 12, 1984, except for tax-
payers who had deducted, rather than credited, foreign taxes on an
earlier federal return. In that case, an election may be made by filing
a timely amended return."' Once an election is made, however, it
may not be revoked." 7
The final Regulations made numerous and substantive changes to
the previously issued proposed and temporary regulations. While this
article will not attempt an in-depth examination of the final Regula-
tions, some of their more significant aspects will be highlighted.
The final Regulations provide that a foreign levy is an income tax
only if (1) the levy is a tax, and (2) the predominant character of
that tax is that of an income tax in the United States sense."' The
predominant character of a foreign tax is that of "an income tax
in the United States sense" if the foreign tax is likely to reach net
gain in the normal circumstances in which the tax applies.' 9 A foreign
tax is likely to reach net gain in the normal circumstances in which
the tax applies if the tax, judged on the basis of its predominant
character, satisfies each of the requirements for (1) realization, (2)
gross receipts, and (3) net income as set forth in the final
Regulations. 120
One of the most striking features of the final Regulations is the
"realization" requirement which may be satisfied even where a tax
is levied on the occurrence of an event prior to an event which would
give rise to taxation under United States law, such as a traditional
112. Proposed regulations were issued on April 5, 1983, 48 FED. REO. 14641; temporary
and proposed regulations were issued on November 17, 1980, 45 FED. REG. 75747 and 75695;
and proposed regulations were issued on June 20, 1979, 44 FED. REG. 36071.
113. 48 FED. REG. 46272 (1983).





119. Id. §§1.902-2(a)(ii) and 1.901-2(a)(3).
120. Id. §1.902-2(b)(1).
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sale or exchange. Under the final Regulations, a foreign tax may satisfy
the realization requirement where the events giving rise to the tax lia-
bility occur prior to events that result in realization under the general
tax law, if the prerealization event is the transfer, processing or export
of readily marketable property. In addition, the Regulations require
that the foreign country not impose a second tax with respect to the
income on which the tax is imposed by reason of the prerealization
event, upon the occurrence of a later event. 121
Under the final Regulations, a foreign tax satisfies the gross receipts
requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, the
tax is imposed on the basis of actual gross receipts, or gross receipts
"computed under a method that is likely to produce an amount that
is not greater than fair market value."' 122
The third element, net income, will meet the requirement under
the final Regulations if, judged on the basis of the predominant
character of the foreign tax, the base of the tax is computed by reduc-
ing gross receipts to permit (1) recovery of the significant costs and
expenses attributable, under reasonable principles, to such gross
receipts, or (2) recovery of such significant costs and expenses com-
puted under a method that is likely to produce an amount that
approximates, or is greater than, recovery of such significant costs
and expenses.' 23
A major element of the final Regulations is the provision for "dual
capacity taxpayers." A person who is subject to a levy by a foreign
state and who also receives or will receive a "specific economic
benefit"' 24 from the foreign state, is referred to as a dual capacity
taxpayer.' 25 Dual capacity taxpayers are subject to special provisions
of the final Regulations which determine what portion of the foreign
levy is creditable. As a rule, no credit is allowable for a payment
pursuant to a foreign levy by a dual capacity taxpayer unless the per-
son claiming such a credit establishes the amount that is paid pur-
suant to the distinct element of the foreign levy that is an income
tax. A foreign levy is not a tax to the extent a person subject to




124. Id. §1.901-2(a)(2)(ii)(B). This section defines a "specific economic benefit" as "an
economic benefit that is not made available on substantially the same terms to substantially
all persons who are subject to the income tax that is generally imposed by the foreign country,
or, if there is no such generally imposed income tax, an economic benefit that is not made
available on substantially the same terms to the population of the country in general." Id.
125. Id. §1.901-2(a)(2)(ii)(A).
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benefit from the foreign country in exchange for payment pursuant
to the levy. 2 6
Even this brief overview makes clear that many provisions of the
final Regulations are at variance with the current Calfiornia standards
regarding the deductibility of foreign taxes under section 24345. The
provisions for dual capacity taxpayers and "income" taxes levied on
prerealization income are two of the major differences which now
exist between the California and federal schemes. The question which
will inevitably arise is whether California should adopt the final Regula-
tions for purposes of defining an income tax under section 24345.
First, California has not expressly adopted the final Regulations,
nor has section 24345 been amended in response to those regulations.
California law is well settled that deductions are a matter of legislative
grace, and that exemptions from taxation must be found in the
statute.' A taxpayer has the burden of showing that the requirements
of the exemption are clearly met, and any doubt is to be resolved
against the right to the exemption."' Based upon these standards and
the language of section 24345, no persuasive argument can be made
that section 24345 itself incorporates the final Regulations.
An argument can be made, however, that the Franchise Tax Board
has by reference incorporated the final Regulations into the Califor-
nia regulatory scheme which interprets the Bank and Corporation Tax
Law. Although the Franchise Tax Board has promulgated regulations
interpreting some portions of section 24345, no regulations have been
issued with respect to subdivision (a)(2)(A) which denies a deduction
for foreign taxes "on or according to or measured by income or pro-
fits .. " 29 Any argument that California has impliedly adopted
the final Regulations would necessarily have to rely upon California
regulation 26422,130 which provides that in the absence of regulations
of the Franchise Tax Board, regulations of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice shall govern the interpretation under specified circumstances of
126. Id. §1.901-2(a)(2)(i).
127. Anaconda Co. v. Franchise Tax Board 130 Cal. App. 3d 15, 32, 181 Cal. Rptr. 640,
651 (1981).
128. Anaconda Co. v. Franchise Tax Board 130 Cal. App. 3d 15, 32, 181 Cal. Rptr. 640,
651 (1981).
129. The Franchise Tax Board has issued regulations interpreting only the following por-
tions of section 24345; Deduction for Taxes or Licenses in General, Title 18, CAL. ADMIN.
CODE, §24345-1; Taxes for Local Benefits, Title 18, CAL. ADiWN. CODE, §24345-2; Federal
Stamp Taxes, Title 18, CAL. ADim. CODE, §24345-3; Sales and Gasoline Taxes, Title 18, CAL.
ADhmN. CODE, §24345-4; Federal Social Security Taxes and State Unemployment Insurance Con-
tributions, Title 18, CAL. ADnmw. CODE, §24345-5; and Taxes of Shareholder Paid by Corpora-
tion, Title 18, CAL. ADbuN. CODE, §24345-6.
130. Title 18 CAL. ADnmN. CODE §26422, is set forth in full, supra note 64.
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conforming California statutes found in the Bank and Corporation
Tax Law.
Regulation 26422, however, is quite limited in scope, and provides
that Internal Revenue Service regulations will only govern the inter-
pretation of "conforming" California statutes, and only "insofar as
possible," with "due account" given for "obvious differences between
state and federal law. . -."' Section 24345 and Internal Revenue
Code section 901, apart from a common reference to "income," have
little else in common, and section 24345 should not be deemed to
constitute a "conforming" statute. In addition to the policy differences
underlying state and federal taxation and the fundamental differences
between a tax based upon source and one based upon residence, deci-
sions such as Huntington Alloys illustrate the substantive differences
between "income" as defined under the California and federal foreign
tax schemes. Differences such as these weigh heavily against any argu-
ment that the final Regulations should be interpretative of section
24345 for purposes of determining the deductibility of a foreign tax
paid or accrued.
CONCLUSION
The treatment of foreign income taxes under section 24345 is an
issue which has undergone numerous changes in recent years. Many
of these changes are the result of the increasingly complex analyses
undertaken by the Board and the courts in determining the nature
of a foreign tax. The analysis of Guettler and Meltzer on the distinc-
tion between income and a return of capital, the analysis of Haubiel
and Bochner which focuses on the specific foreign tax in issue, the
analysis of Beamer and MCA on the distinction between gross in-
come and gross receipts, and the analysis of Occidental Petroleum
on realization and economic gain have all been attempts to clarify
increasingly more complex issues in this area. Other issues, such as
the impact of the final Federal Regulations on the California scheme,
are far from settled. The treatment of foreign income taxes under
the Bank and Corporation Tax Law remains a hybrid of state and
federal tax law principles.
131. See supra note 65.
